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THE “CHAUDHRY COURT”: DECONSTRUCTING
THE “JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS” IN PAKISTAN
Moeen H. Cheema †
Abstract:
The Supreme Court of Pakistan underwent a remarkable
transformation in its institutional role and constitutional position during the tenure of
the former Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry (2005–2013).
This era in Pakistan’s judicial history was also marked by great controversy as the
court faced charges that it had engaged in “judicial activism,” acted politically, and
violated the constitutionally mandated separation of powers between institutions of
the state. This article presents an in-depth analysis of the judicial review actions of
the Chaudhry Court and argues that the charge of judicial activism is theoretically
unsound and analytically obfuscating. The notion of judicial activism is premised on
the existence of artificial distinctions between law, politics and policy and fails to
provide a framework for adequately analyzing or evaluating the kind of judicial
politics Pakistan has recently experienced. The Supreme Court’s role, like that of
any apex court with constitutional and administrative law jurisdiction, has always
been deeply and structurally political and will continue to be so in the future. As
such, this article focuses on the nature and consequences of the Chaudhry Court’s
judicial politics rather than addressing the issue of whether it indulged in politics at
all. It analyzes the underlying causes that enabled the court to exercise an expanded
judicial function and in doing so engages with the literature on the “judicialization of
politics” around the world.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The tenure of the former Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar
Muhammad Chaudhry 1 has undoubtedly been characterized by
remarkable developments in the institutional role and jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court of Pakistan. This recent era in Pakistan’s legal history,
that of the “Chaudhry Court,” 2 was also marked by great controversy and
vociferous debate on the place of the Supreme Court in Pakistan’s state
structure and constitutional politics. By the end of Chief Justice
Chaudhry’s tenure in December 2013, the Court faced a chorus of
†
Lecturer, ANU College of Law, Australian National University (ANU). Qualifications: Ph.D.
Candidate (ANU); LL.M. (Harvard); LL.B. (London). This article is dedicated to Momina Cheema
(1985-2011), University of Virginia School of Law class of 2013, whose short life and remarkable
achievements will always be an inspiration. I am grateful to Professor Peter Cane (Distinguished
Professor, ANU College of Law) and Leighton McDonald (Associate Professor, ANU College of Law)
for painstaking reviews of several drafts as a result of which this article is much improved. I am also
grateful to The Centre for Asian Legal Studies (CALS) and Asian Law Institute (ASLI) at the National
University of Singapore for selecting this article for presentation at the Asian Legal Studies: New
Issues and New Scholarship Workshop, 2013.
1
Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry served as the Chief Justice of Pakistan from 2005 to 2013.
Former President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, twice removed him as the Chief Justice in
March and November 2007. He was restored as the Chief Justice in the aftermath of a populist
movement for the restoration of an independent judiciary led by the country’s lawyers. Justice
Chaudhry was the recipient of the prestigious Harvard Law School Medal of Freedom in 2007.
2
See generally THE POLITICS & JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CHAUDHRY COURT (Moeen H.
Cheema and Ijaz Shafi Gilani eds., 2014) [hereinafter POLITICS & JURISPRUDENCE].
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charges that it had engaged in “judicial activism”—a term that was
overwhelmingly used in a negative sense and as shorthand for allegations
that the Court had acted politically, violated the constitutionally mandated
separation of powers between institutions of the state, and over-reached
its powers. 3
This article presents a deeper analysis of the judicial review actions
of the Supreme Court during Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad
Chaudhry’s tenure, and attempts to deconstruct the charge of judicial
activism that has gained such currency in public discourse in Pakistan.
Rather than focusing only on high-profile constitutional and overtly
political cases as most analyses of the Court’s jurisprudence do, this
article also scrutinizes the Court’s administrative law jurisprudence, the
judicial review of executive action, which was the cause of the real power
struggle between the judiciary and the executive. 4 The challenges to the
political executive’s control of the civil state institutions (bureaucracy,
police, statutory corporations, regulatory agencies and the National
Accountability Bureau) remained the site of underlying struggles that
periodically spilled over or manifested in other areas of judicial action.
For example, the Supreme Court’s use of suo motu powers to initiate
judicial review actions based on media reports of maladministration or
governmental corruption was at the heart of much of the controversy.

3

This critique dominated the public discourse on the Chaudhry Court, especially in Pakistan’s
English-language press and international media outlets. See, e.g., Asad Jamal, Who will hold the courts
accountable, EXPRESS TRIBUNE (Oct. 8, 2010), http://tribune.com.pk/story/60100/who-will-hold-thecourts-accountable/; Saroop Ijaz, The Case for Judicial Minimalism in Pakistan, JURIST (Oct. 11, 2010,
10:42 AM), http://jurist.org/forum/2010/10/the-case-for-judicial-minimalism-in-pakistan.php; Declan
Walsh, Pakistan Court Widens Role, Stirring Fears for Stability, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/23/world/asia/pakistan-high-court-widens-role-and-stirs-fears.html?
pagewanted=all; Faisal Hussain, Outcome of judicial activism, DAWN (Jan. 2, 1013, 12:05 AM),
http://www.dawn.com/news/775678/outcome-of-judicial-activism; I.A. Rehman, Judiciary at This
Point, THE NEWS (Feb. 19, 2012), http://jang.com.pk/thenews/feb2012-weekly/nos-19-022012/spr.htm#2; Azam Khan, Judicial activism: 20,000-plus cases still pending before top court,
EXPRESS TRIBUNE (Oct. 16, 2013), http://tribune.com.pk/story/618834/judicial-activism-20000-pluscases-still-pending-before-top-court/; Maryam S. Khan, Ambiguous Ambitions, QANTARA (Dec. 19,
2013), http://en.qantara.de/content/pakistans-supreme-court-ambiguous-ambitions. The critique was
widely shared by international observers such as the International Commission of Jurists, the
International Crisis Group, and the Asian Human Rights Commission. See, e.g., INT’L COMMISSION OF
JURISTS (ICJ), AUTHORITY WITHOUT ACCOUNTABILITY: THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE IN PAKISTAN, (Dec.
5, 2013), http://www.refw orld.org/pdfid/530f088d4.pdf.
4
The assertion that judicial review of executive action was the more significant or even primary
site of contention between the judiciary and the executive is borne out by a study of the suo motu
actions of the court during the former Chief Justice’s tenure. Of the suo motu actions initiated by the
court, 38% dealt with executive inefficiency, 34% with alleged abuses of executive powers, and 11%
with corruption allegations. Given that the Chief Justice had considerable discretion in the choice of
subject matter in suo motu cases, these statistics directly reflect the priorities of the court. See Asher A.
Qazi, Suo Motu: Choosing not to Legislate, in POLITICS & JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, at 281, 302.
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Based on such an in-depth scrutiny of the judicial review actions of
the Chaudhry Court, this article argues that the charges of judicial
activism, which violates the constitutionally mandated separation of
powers, are theoretically unsound and analytically obfuscating. It further
argues that the very framing of the debate in terms of judicial activism is
ideologically conservative as it essentially serves to mask and justify
elitist forms of politics and governance. 5 The notion of judicial
activism—premised as it is on the existence of artificial distinctions
between law, politics and policy—fails to provide a framework for
adequately analyzing or evaluating the kind of judicial politics Pakistan
has recently experienced. The Supreme Court’s role, like that of any
apex court with constitutional and administrative law jurisdiction, has
always been deeply and structurally political and will continue to be so in
the future. 6 This article thus examines the nature and consequences of the
Chaudhry Court’s judicial politics rather than addressing whether it
indulged in politics at all. It analyzes the underlying political causes that
enabled the Court to exercise an expanded judicial function and, in doing
so, engages with the literature on the “judicialization of politics” around
the world. 7
Part I of the article presents a brief overview of a series of events
and high profile constitutional cases that politicized Pakistan’s Supreme
Court during the tenure of Chief Justice Chaudhry and brought on the
charges of judicial activism. Part II presents a detailed account of the
judicial review of executive action by the Chaudhry Court that resulted in
a protracted tussle between the elected government and the judiciary over
the shape and powers of the state structure (bureaucracy, police, public
corporations, and regulatory agencies). Next, Part III presents a
5
This particular critique of the rhetoric of judicial activism was made most forcefully by
Upendra Baxi in an earlier era of “judicial populism” in India. See Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering
Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India, in THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES
107 (1985). See also Jamie Cassells, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India:
Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495 (1989).
6
As Baxi notes, the “Indian Supreme Court is a center of political power, even though a
vulnerable one. It is a center of political power simply because it can influence the agenda of political
action, control over which is what power politics is in reality all about.” UPENDRA BAXI, THE INDIAN
SUPREME COURT AND POLITICS 10 (1979).
7
See generally, THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate & Torbjorn
Vallinder eds., 1995); ON LAW, POLITICS AND JUDICIALIZATION (Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet
eds., 2002); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004) [hereinafter HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY]; Ran Hirschl, The New
Constitutionalism and the Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 721
(2006) [hereinafter Hirschl, The New Constitutionalism]; Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of MegaPolitics and the Rise of Political Courts, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 93 (2008) [hereinafter Hirschl, The
Judicialization]; RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (Tom
Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008) [hereinafter RULE BY LAW]; THE JUDICIALIZATION OF
POLITICS IN ASIA (Bjorn Dressel ed., 2012).
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deconstruction of the charge of judicial activism and overreach, and
highlights the inadequacy of a traditional paradigm of judicial role. Part
IV engages with the literature on the judicialization of politics and
analyzes the extent to which such theoretical framing accounts for
expansion in judicial power and provides a basis for evaluation of the
court’s actions. A concise evaluation of the post-Chaudhry Supreme
Court’s role in Pakistan’s politics will follow as well as a tentative
conclusion on the Chaudhry Court’s legacy.
II.

THE “POLITICIZATION” OF THE JUDICIARY: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
AND POLITICS OF THE CHAUDHRY COURT

Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry became the Chief Justice of
Pakistan in the end June 2005. Given the fixity of retirement age and the
“seniority principle”—Supreme Court judges retire at the age of sixtyfive and at the retirement of the Chief Justice the next most senior judge
as determined by date of elevation to the court must be appointed as the
Chief Justice—he seemed destined to enjoy the longest tenure in
Pakistan’s history. While the power of a Chief Justice in forming
benches, allocating cases and thus shaping a court’s agenda is
considerable, there was little indication at the time of his appointment as
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court that the judiciary would play a
significant role in Pakistan’s constitutional politics. Justice Chaudhry had
been elevated to the Supreme Court in 2000 during the early days of the
incumbent military regime of General Pervez Musharraf, and had served
on a court that displayed little inclination towards challenging a militaryled executive. He had been part of the benches that validated General
Musharraf’s military coup, which enabled him to amend the constitution
and retain the command of the military while also being the President of
the country. 8 Yet, in a dramatically disrupted tenure Justice Chaudhry
pushed the court from the periphery of the state to the center of
constitutional politics in Pakistan. 9
A.

The “Lawyers’ Movement” and the Transition to Democratic
Governance (2007–2009)

In March 2007, General Musharraf, Pakistan's President and
military ruler since 1999, suspended Justice Chaudhry from the office of
8
See Shah v. Musharraf, (2000) PLD (SC) 869; Ahmad v. Musharraf, (2002) SCMR 970;
Wattan Party v. Chief Executive, (2003) PLD (SC) 74; Pakistan Lawyers Forum v. Fed’n of Pakistan,
(2005) PLD (SC) 719.
9
For a discussion on the impact of judges working in extra-judicial roles, see generally
Stefanus Hendrianto, The Rise and Fall of Historic Chief Justices: Constitutional Politics and Judicial
Leadership in Indonesia, 25 WASH INT’L L.J. 489 (2016).
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Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on charges of misconduct. 10 The
reasons for the President’s action, which subsequently caused him great
political difficulties, cannot be fully explained. While one may refer to
some leading cases in which the Supreme Court had nullified the actions
of the government and caused it some embarrassment at a time when the
military regime was gearing up to manage yet another phase of
transitional elections, 11 it is hard to find concrete reasons for believing
that the Chief Justice or the court directly threatened the Musharraf
regime. One can only speculate that, as presidential and general elections
vital for the continuation of the military regime were scheduled for late
2007, even such limited judicial independence was intolerable to the
regime. 12 The dismissal of the Chief Justice unleashed a wave of protests
by lawyers as well as broader political dissent that quickly spun out of
control. 13 In the course of the so-called “Lawyers’ Movement,” the
opposition political parties, especially the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP),
which participated actively in these early stages of the movement, were
considerably strengthened. Nonetheless, before the Lawyers' Movement
could develop into a broader social mobilization, the Chief Justice won a
case challenging his dismissal. In July 2007, an emboldened Supreme
Court declared the President’s actions to be mala fide and restored Justice
Chaudhry as the Chief Justice. 14
Reinforced by the overwhelming support of the bar, its prime
constituency, and emboldened by the broadening public support for its
newfound stature, the superior courts began a phase of “judicial
activism,” which was largely seen by the lawyers and the media as a
positive development. 15 As the federal Parliament neared the end of its
10

See Moeen Cheema, Justice Derailed in Pakistan: The Sacking of the CJ, JURIST (Mar. 13,
2007, 8:01 AM ET), http://jurist.org/forum/2007/03/justice-derailed-in-pakistan-sacking-of.php.
11
See, e.g., Wattan Party v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (2006) PLD (SC) 697; Constitution Petition No. 5
of 2007, Supreme Court of Pakistan; Haider v. Capital Dev. Auth., (2006) PLD (SC) 394; Constitution
Petition No. 29 of 2007, Supreme Court of Pakistan.
12
For an analysis of the causes behind the dismissal and an explanation of judicial behavior, see
Shoaib A. Ghias, Miscarriage of Chief Justice: Judicial Power and the Legal Complex in Pakistan
under Musharraf, in FATES OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM IN THE BRITISH POST-COLONY 340 (Terrence C.
Halliday et al. eds., 2014). Ghias argues that the court’s suo motu actions prior to 2007 on issues
concerning urban planning and construction, deregulation of commodity pricing mechanisms,
privatization of state enterprises, enforced disappearances, and illegal detentions by security
agencies, as well as the constitutional questions surrounding the forthcoming presidential elections
provided the impetus for dismissal of the Chief Justice. Id. at 346–50.
13
See Lawyers protest against Musharraf, BBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2007, 11:40 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6441133.stm; In Pictures: Lawyers’ Protest, BBC NEWS, (March
12, 2007, 16:31 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_pictures/6442747.stm.
14
See Chaudhry v. President of Pakistan, (2007) PLD (SC) 578; Chaudhry v. President of
Pakistan, (2010) PLD (SC) 61.
15
See, e.g., Imtiaz Gul, Inhumanity of organ trade, IMATIAZ GUL OFFICIAL WEBSITE: THE NEWS
(Aug. 13, 2007), http://www.imtiazgul.com/24.html.
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term, the Supreme Court began to focus on political procedural issues, the
resolution of which would free up political space and allow the possibility
of greater democratization. In several cases the Court pushed for equal
electioneering opportunities for opposition political parties that would
undermine the military regime’s attempts at managing yet another façade
of democratic transition. Prior to the general elections scheduled for the
end of 2007, General Musharraf intended to ensure a successful result in
a presidential election that would guarantee him another five-year term in
office. Success would be ensured if he continued to occupy the office of
the Chief of Army Staff (CoAS), the real source of power. Rumors of a
political deal being brokered by the American and British governments
between the military regime and Benazir Bhutto’s PPP were rife.
Pursuant to this deal, General Musharraf would be guaranteed a secure
term as Presidency even if his supporters lost in the general elections and
even if he subsequently gave up the office of the military chief.
Such speculations gained credence when, on the eve of presidential
elections in October 2007, General Musharraf passed the National
Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) granting immunity from long-standing
corruption charges to a number of PPP leaders. In a controversial
election the next day, General Musharraf secured more than half of the
votes cast by the electoral college. Members of federal and provincial
legislatures belonging to the PPP noticeably abstained, thereby
facilitating his re-election. Within a week of the promulgation of the
NRO, the Supreme Court admitted a petition challenging its
constitutionality and took an unprecedented step by granting an interim
injunction against the operation of the ordinance. 16 Earlier, General
Musharraf's re-election as President had also been challenged before the
resurgent Supreme Court. 17 The Court allowed the election to proceed
subject to the condition that the election results could not be formally
announced until its final decision. The most important legal question
before the Court was whether a serving chief of the army may validly
contest the election for the presidency. Fearing an adverse verdict,
General Musharraf imposed a state of emergency on November 3, 2007. 18
This was in reality martial law. The military regime suspended the
constitution and issued a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) that
16

See Hassan v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (2008) PLD (SC) 80.
See Moeen Cheema, Supreme Challenge: Pakistan's Presidential Election Goes to Court,
JURIST, (Oct. 18, 2007, 8:01AM), http://www.jurist.org/forum/2007/10/supreme-challenge-pakistans.
php.
18
See Moeen Cheema, Martial Law by Another Name in Pakistan, JURIST, (Nov. 3, 2007, 8:01
AM), http://jurist.org/forum/2007/11/martial-law-by-another-name-in-pakistan.php.
17
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purported to grant itself the authority to rule, legislate, and even make
constitutional amendments. 19 This state of emergency was designed
primarily to undermine the independence of the judiciary, and judges of
the superior courts were asked to take a fresh oath of office under the
PCO. 20 A majority of the Supreme Court and High Court judges either
refused to take such an oath or were not invited to do so. 21 New judges
were appointed in their places and Justice Chaudhry was thus dismissed
for the second time in a year. The protests by lawyers and civil society
activists were brutally suppressed. 22 The military regime was intent on
maintaining control by suppressing the protest movement. It needed the
space to implement its immediate plans of achieving legal cover for its
actions from an acquiescent judiciary as well as to offer sufficient
political incentives to wean political parties from participation in the
protest movement. The reconstituted Supreme Court rejected the
constitutional challenges to General Musharraf's re-election and validated
the imposition of emergency. 23
General Musharraf announced plans to hold elections in early 2008
and, feeling somewhat confident about the prospect of another term in the
presidency, reluctantly relinquished the command of the armed forces.
Prior to ending the emergency, President Musharraf exercised his selfgranted powers by amending the constitution to provide constitutional
cover to actions undertaken during the emergency period, including the
removal of superior court judges. 24 The assassination of Benazir Bhutto
in December 2007, however, plunged the nation into confusion and utter
grief and cast a long shadow over the prospects of a transition to greater
democracy. General elections were belatedly held in February 2008 after
Asif Ali Zardari, who had taken over the chairmanship of the PPP and the
Pakistan Muslim League (PML(N)) leadership, agreed with the military
regime on an electoral plan. Both these parties emerged as the biggest
winners although no single party commanded an outright majority. 25 The
19

Provisional Constitution Order, 2007 (President's Order No. 1 of 2007).
Oath of Office (Judges) Order, 2007, (Nov. 3, 2007).
21
See Moeen Cheema, Pakistan: Mock Trials, Kangaroo Courts and Court Jesters, JURIST,
(Nov. 9, 2007, 8:01 AM), http://jurist.org/forum/2007/11/pakistan-mock-trials-kangaroo-courts.php. In
total 61 judges of the superior courts were thus deposed: 13 out of 18 (17 permanent and one ad-hoc)
Supreme Court judges, including the Chief Justice; 18 out of 31 Lahore High Court judges; 24 out of
28 Sindh High Court judges, including the Chief Justice; and 6 out of 13 Peshawar High Court judges,
including the Chief Justice.
22
See Moeen Cheema, Musharraf's Real “War on Terror” in Pakistan, JURIST, (Nov. 6, 2007,
8:01AM), http://jurist.org/forum/2007/11/musharrafs-real-war-on-terror-in.php.
23
See Ahmed v. Chief Election Comm’r, Islamabad, (2008) PLD (SC) 13; Khan v. Musharaf,
(2008) PLD (SC) 178.
24
Constitution (Amendment) Order, 2007 (President's Order No. 5 of 2007).
25
Party Position in National Assembly: Result of Elections 2008, GEO TV,
http://www.geo.tv/election2008/images/data/NAPosition.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2016).
20
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parties, historically archrivals, unveiled an accord to form a coalition
government and to restore the deposed judges, who were immediately
released from house arrest. Optimism about the restoration of judges
began to fade, however, as disagreement over the procedure for the
restoration emerged between the coalition partners. 26
PML(N) members resigned from the coalition government citing
the refusal of the PPP to honour its commitments regarding the
restoration of the judges. After protracted talks, the parties reached
another agreement in early August pursuant to which President Musharraf
would be impeached by parliament and the judges restored soon
thereafter. As the threat of impeachment crystallized, Musharraf resigned
as President and the PPP immediately announced Asif Zardari as its
candidate for the vacant presidency. In September 2008, Asif Zardari
won the election to become the President of Pakistan, an office that gave
him immunity from prosecution for corruption charges. In the aftermath
of President Zardari's election the Lawyers' Movement appeared to have
lost all steam. A number of deposed Supreme Court and High Court
judges took oaths of office, thereby breaking ranks with the Chief Justice
and the Lawyers' Movement. 27 Prominent government representatives
made frequent statements on national media implying that the person of
Justice Chaudhry had been politicized during the movement and he was
no longer fit to act in a judicial capacity.
However, the lawyers announced plans to organize a “Long
March” on the capital in March 2009 with the support of opposition
political parties. As thousands marched towards Islamabad demanding
the reinstatement of Justice Chaudhry, the PPP government buckled
under the threat of a violent confrontation with the protesters and the
pressure of the military command. 28 Contrary to the fears of an
immediate backlash against the elected government that had resisted the
Chief Justice and the other judges’ reinstatement, the Court initially
proceeded cautiously and began the task of dismantling the legal
consequences of the emergency. The Supreme Court declared the
imposition of emergency by General Musharraf to be unconstitutional. 29
The Court then held that, since the office of the Chief Justice had never
legally fallen vacant, the purported appointment of Justice Dogar as Chief
26

See generally, RAJSHREE JETLY, THE UNRAVELLING OF COALITION POLITICS IN PAKISTAN:
INSTITUTE OF SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES (ISAS) BRIEF NO. 66 (2008).
27
See Moeen Cheema, The End of the Lawyers’ Movement in Pakistan?, JURIST (Sept. 16, 2008,
8:01AM), http://jurist.org/forum/2008/09/end-of-lawyers-movement-in-pakistan.php.
28
See Pakistan Media Reaction: March 17, 2009, WIKILEAKS.ORG, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/
cables/09ISLAMABAD564_a.html.
29
Sindh High Court Bar Assoc. v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (2009) PLD (SC) 879.
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Justice was void. The Court then began the process of removing judges
appointed in the aftermath of the emergency on the basis that the
constitutional requirement of consultation with the Chief Justice had not
been satisfied. As Justice Dogar was never the lawful Chief Justice, all
appointments to judicial office made in consultation with him were,
therefore, also nullified. 30
The Supreme Court did not, however, automatically invalidate all
of the actions taken pursuant to the emergency. In a show of respect for
the democratic process unfolding in the aftermath of the emergency, the
Court accepted the validity of the February 2008 elections, the formation
of federal and provincial governments thereafter, and the election of
President Zardari. While the Court stripped General Musharraf’s
emergency ordinances of permanency, it did not immediately declare
them to be null and void. It was only in November 2009, when the Court
declared the NRO to be unconstitutional and void ab initio, that an overt
confrontation between the judiciary and the executive materialized. 31
The decision resurrected all criminal cases covered by the ordinance
including those against prominent politicians belonging to the PPP
government and senior bureaucrats, some of whom occupied key posts in
the federal and provincial governments. Most notably, the list of NRO
beneficiaries included Pakistan's incumbent President, who stood accused
of serious corruption and money-laundering charges in Pakistan,
Switzerland, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
B.

Tensions between the Political Executive and the Chaudhry Court
(2009–2013)

While the Court had a strong constitutional basis for striking down
the ordinance, one aspect of the judgment ensured that political volatility
between the elected executive and the judiciary would continue. This
related to the withdrawal of corruption and money-laundering charges
against the President in Switzerland (the so-called “Swiss case”). This
case had been initiated through a mutual legal assistance request by the
Government of Pakistan in 1998. As investigations in the case were
30
See Bhinder v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (2010) PLD (SC) 483. The Court was particularly severe on
those judges who had held office prior to the emergency and had taken oath under the PCO. Contempt
of court notices were issued to these judges compelling their resignations. See Abdul Hameed Dogar v.
Federation Of Pakistan, (2010) SCMR 312; Dogar v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (2011) PLD (SC) 315;
Criminal Original Petitions No. 93 to 98, 100 & 104 of 2009 and 2, 3 & 4 of 2011; (2011) PLD (SC)
197; Khan v. Registrar, Supreme Court Of Pakistan, (2010) PLD (SC) 806.
31
See Hassan v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (2010) PLD (SC) 1. See also Moeen Cheema, Back to the
Future: The Pakistan Supreme Court's NRO Judgment, JURIST (Jan. 14, 2010, 8:01 AM),
http://www.jurist.org/forum/2010/01/back-to-future-pakistan-supreme-court-s.php.
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nearing a conclusion in April 2008, the Attorney General of Pakistan
withdrew the declaration of the Government of Pakistan’s interest as a
civil party in the case, citing the NRO as justification for the withdrawal.
The Supreme Court of Pakistan took exception to the manner in which
the Swiss case had been closed. In its order, the Court declared that all
actions taken pursuant to the NRO were illegal and directed the
government to take immediate steps to reverse the benefits of the NRO,
including the withdrawal of its interest in the Swiss case. This would
have effectively required the federal government to play a role in reinitiating money-laundering charges against the President in a foreign
jurisdiction. Quite expectedly, the government resisted.
In the government’s defense, at least in regards to the order
affecting the Swiss case, there was room to argue that it violated the
immunity of the President from criminal prosecution under Article 248 of
the Constitution. 32 Furthermore, the President was likely to be covered
by international law of sovereign immunity in the proceedings before
Swiss courts. However, the President never formally claimed immunity
before the Court. The government also dragged its feet in implementing
other aspects of the judgment, including the dismissal of all NRO
beneficiaries from important positions in the bureaucracy as it was
directed to do by the Court. 33 This resulted in a protracted battle with the
Supreme Court, characterized by contempt and insubordination in the
government’s dilatory tactics. As the Court’s order to void the NRO
remained largely unimplemented, the Court built up pressure through
enforcement proceedings. 34 In addition to resisting the enforcement of
Court directives, it appeared that the government's strategy was to
politicize the actions of the superior courts and to create an impression of
victimization at the hands of the judiciary and, indirectly, the military
establishment. Leading government party figures began making
comments to the effect that, from the government's perspective, the court
was displaying vindictiveness and political bias.
While hearings on the review and enforcement petitions in the
NRO case dragged on, another important constitutional case brought the
Parliament and the judiciary into direct confrontation. In April 2010, the
Parliament passed the 18th Amendment to the Constitution with
32

PAKISTAN CONST. art. 248(2).
See Faisal Shakeel, President, PM threatened: apex court brandishes ‘disqualification’ sword,
EXPRESS TRIBUNE (Jan. 10, 2012), http://tribune.com.pk/story/319251/supreme-court-reservesjudgement-in-nro-implementation-case/; Text of SC order in NRO case, DAWN (Jan. 10, 2012),
http://www.dawn.com/news/687167/text-of-sc-order-in-nro-case.
34
Id.
33
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widespread support from across the political divides. 35 The most
significant aspect of the constitutional amendment was the undoing of the
constitutional changes of the Musharraf era, which transferred key
powers to the presidency. The 18th Amendment tilted the balance of
powers back toward the Parliament and the elected executive, at least in
regards to constitutional form. 36 The 18th Amendment also introduced
significant reforms to the electoral process.37 Additionally, there was a
serious attempt to redress the historical imbalance between federal and
provincial powers by abolishing the “Concurrent List.” The list specified
legislative powers common to both federal and provincial legislatures,
and had effectively granted ascendancy to the federation over a vast array
of subjects. 38 The amendment also added fundamental rights to
information and compulsory education and bolstered the bill of rights
with the addition of rights to “fair trial” and “due process” that may have
a far-reaching impact on the rights jurisprudence of Pakistan's courts. 39
The 18th Amendment was seen by many as a watershed for
democratic politics in Pakistan and raised the prestige of the country's
political parties. While there was much to commend about the
amendment, it also attracted immediate controversy. Petitions were filed
before the Supreme Court to challenge one particular aspect of the
amendment: the revamped process of judicial appointment. 40 As opposed
to the earlier process of judicial appointment based upon the binding
recommendations of the respective chief justices of superior courts, the
Amendment entrusted judicial appointments to a newly created judicial
35

PAKISTAN CONST., amended by Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010.
See PAKISTAN CONST. arts. 75, 90, 101, 232, & 243 amended by Constitution (Eighteenth
Amendment) Act, 2010, §§ 26, 28, 33 86, & 90. The President's power to delay assent to bills of
Parliament was also constrained. Most notably, the President's powers to dismiss the government and
dissolve parliament was confined. See PAKISTAN CONST. art. 58(2)(b), amended by Constitution
(Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, § 17. Furthermore, the President was bound to act “on and in
accordance” with the advice of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. See PAKISTAN CONST. art. 48,
amended by Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, § 15.
37
See PAKISTAN CONST. art. 213 & 224, amended by Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act,
2010, §§ 77 & 83. While the 18th Amendment undid most of the constitutional changes brought about
by General Musharraf, it retained several positive aspects of the military regime’s initiatives. See
PAKISTAN CONST. art. 51, 59, & 106, amended by Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, §§
16, 18, & 36.
38
See PAKISTAN CONST. art. 142, amended by Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010,
§ 49. Only the areas of criminal law, criminal procedure, and evidence were left as common domain.
Other long standing provincial concerns, such as federal control over natural resources and decisionmaking on the construction of mega-hydroelectric projects, were also addressed. See PAKISTAN
CONST. art. 157 & 161, amended by Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, §§ 58 & 60.
39
See PAKISTAN CONST. art. 19(A), 25(A), & 10(A), inserted by Constitution (Eighteenth
Amendment) Act, 2010, §§ 7, 9, & 5.
40
See PAKISTAN CONST. art. 175(A), amended by Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act,
2010, § 67.
36
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commission and a parliamentary committee. 41 This change in the
appointment procedure so soon after the superior judiciary had won its
hard-earned independence aroused suspicion that the real aim of this
amendment was the subjugation of the judiciary, rather than meaningful
reform of the appointment process. Arguments were raised that the
amendment violated the “basic structure” of the constitution by
undermining the independence of the judiciary and the separation of
powers. This raised concerns that the Supreme Court might consider
invalidating a constitutional amendment relying upon precedents
established earlier by the Indian Supreme Court.
In October 2010, the Supreme Court issued an interim order and,
adopting a “dialogic approach,” referred certain matters back to the
Parliament for consideration. The court noted several aspects of the
amendment that, in its opinion, might undermine the independence of the
judiciary, including: the role of the Chief Justice had been considerably
reduced; representatives of the executive had been given an equal role in
the Judicial Commission; and a Parliamentary Committee had been
granted virtual veto powers in judicial appointments. 42 The Supreme
Court recommended several changes to the judicial appointment process
in its interim order, most of which were adopted by the Parliament
However, the Supreme Court's
through the 19th Amendment. 43
recommendation that the Judicial Commission be granted the final say in
judicial appointments was disregarded. 44 In February 2011, the issue of
judicial appointments arose once again when a bench suspended the
decision of the Parliamentary Committee rejecting nominations of four
candidates for appointment to the provincial High Court by the Judicial
Commission. The court reasserted the judiciary's control over the subject
of judicial appointment by holding the decision of the Parliamentary
Committee and its reasons to be reviewable. This effectively reverted the
41
A new article 175(A)(2) on the “Appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court, High Courts
and the Federal Shariat Court” provided for the composition of the judicial commission as follows:
“For appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court, the Commission shall consist of—(i) Chief Justice
of Pakistan; (ii) Members: four most senior Judges of the Supreme Court; (iii) Member: a former Chief
Justice or a former Judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan to be nominated by the Chief Justice of
Pakistan, in consultation with the two member Judges, for a period of two years; (iv) Member: Federal
Minister for Law and Justice; (v) Member: Attorney-General for Pakistan; and (vi) Member: a Senior
Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan nominated by the Pakistan Bar Council for a term of two
years.”
42
Ahmad v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (2010) PLD (SC) 1165.
43
In particular, judicial representation on the Commission was increased from two to four, the
Parliamentary Committee was required to give reasons in case of a rejection of the Judicial
Commission's nomination, and the Committee's hearings were mandated to be held in camera. See
PAKISTAN CONST. amended by Constitution (Nineteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, § 4.
44
See PAKISTAN CONST. art. 175(A)(12), amended by Constitution (Nineteenth Amendment)
Act, 2010, § 4(e)(ii).
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process of judicial appointments to that adopted by the court through the
so-called “Judges’ case” in the 1990s, albeit with a much broader
consultation requirement. 45
By 2012 the relations between the judiciary and the elected
institutions reached a tense but stable equilibrium. However, as the
sitting Parliament entered the fifth and final year of its term, the NRO
saga took yet another turn. The Supreme Court, which had earlier
compelled the removal of the chairman of the National Accountability
Bureau (NAB), the country's corruption watchdog, for his failure to assist
the court in the NRO case and had also invalidated the appointment of the
Prosecutor General, now voided the purported appointment of the
incumbent Chairman of the NAB on account of the government's failure
to hold a meaningful consultation with the leader of the opposition as
required by law. 46 The possibility that it might be compelled to appoint a
neutral person to the post of Chairman NAB, an office responsible for the
investigation and prosecution of corruption offenses, brought the
government face to face with a battle for its political survival. On the
other hand, frustrated with its inability to compel the government to abide
by its orders, not only in the NRO case but also a host of other cases, the
Supreme Court charged the Prime Minister with contempt of court.
In April 2012, a seven-member bench of the Supreme Court
convicted the Prime Minister for contempt of court and imposed a
nominal sentence. 47 The Prime Minister’s legal team decided not to file
an appeal against the conviction. The Speaker of the National Assembly
disposed of a reference calling for the disqualification of the Prime
Minister without furnishing any reasons. A three member bench headed
by the Chief Justice admitted for hearing a petition challenging the
Speaker’s decision. The bench held that Article 63(1)(g) applied in this
instance and was self-executing. Article 63(1)(g) provides for the
45

In Al-Jehad Trust v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (1996) PLD (SC) 324, known as the “Judges’ case,”
the Supreme Court examined a range of issues related to judicial appointments. The key question was
whether the president had unfettered discretion in appointing judges to the superior courts under
Articles 177 and 193 of the Constitution. The relevant constitutional provisions required the president
to make appointments to the Supreme Court “after consultation with” the Chief Justice of Pakistan
(CJP), and appointments to the High Courts “after consultation with” the CJP and the Chief Justice
(CJ) of the concerned High Court. Relying upon the principle of judicial independence in Islam and
Indian precedents, the Supreme Court held that the president could not reject a chief justice’s
nomination without giving cogent objective reasons, nor appoint someone whose nomination had been
rejected by the CJP or the CJ of the High Court. This effectively gave the chief justices the final say in
judicial appointments.
46
See Bank of Punjab v. Haris Steel Ind. Ltd., (2010) PLC (SC) 1109; Orakzai v. Pakistan,
(2011) PLD (SC) 365.
47
See Criminal Original Petition No. 06 of 2012 in Suo Motu Case No. 04 of 2010, (2012) PLD
(SC) 553.
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disqualification of a member of Parliament if “he has been convicted by a
court of competent jurisdiction for propagating any opinion, or acting in
any manner, prejudicial to . . . the integrity or independence of the
judiciary of Pakistan, or which defames or brings into ridicule the
judiciary.” 48 The Court thus disqualified and unseated an elected Prime
Minister for failure to obey its directions in the NRO case, specifically in
regard to the instruction to write a letter to Swiss authorities. 49 The PPP’s
replacement in the office of the Prime Minister found himself in a similar
situation facing contempt proceedings before the Supreme Court. 50 The
tension was finally diffused when the successor Prime Minister wrote a
letter to Swiss prosecutors in accordance with the instructions of the
Court. The ease with which the controversy was ultimately resolved
reflected badly on both the elected institutions and the Court.
As Pakistan moved toward another general election and neared the
completion of an elected government’s tenure for the first time since the
1970s, the Supreme Court appeared to be playing a significant role in
undermining the electoral prospects of the incumbent government. 51
However, the protracted tussle with the executive had begun to take its
toll on the court’s credibility and public perception as well. A few
decisions in 2012 courted extensive controversy in addition to the Prime
Minister’s contempt saga. 52 The Justice Chaudhry’s personal reputation
came under intense public scrutiny when the Chief Justice’s son was
accused of financial impropriety and receiving funds from a property
developer to allegedly influence the Chief Justice position in certain
cases. 53 While the developer in question subsequently admitted before
the court that this attempt to curry favour with the Chief Justice had been
futile, Justice Chaudhry’s actions in initiating a suo motu case to
48

See PAKISTAN CONST. art. 63.
See Siddique v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (2012) PLD (SC) 660. The author served as the Judges’
Associate to the Supreme Court bench that decided the so-called Prime Minister’s disqualification case.
50
See Criminal Original Petition No. 74 of 2012, In Suo Motu Case No. 04 of 2010, (2012) PLD
(SC) 1086.
51
Other cases which caused simmering tensions between the judiciary and the executive
included cases concerning the disqualification of members of parliament for submitting fake academic
degrees in the 2008 elections and for possessing dual citizenship. See Muhammad Rizwan Gill v.
Nadia Aziz, (2010) PLD (SC) 828; Mian Najeeb-ud-Din Owaisi and another v. Amir Yar Waran and
others, (2013) PLD (SC) 482; Syed Mehmood Akhtar Naqvi v. Federation of Pakistan, (2012) PLD
(SC) 1089.
52
See, e.g., Watan Party and others v. Federation of Pakistan, (2012) PLD (SC) 292. This socalled “Memo case” arose out of an alleged secret memorandum to U.S. government by Mr. Hussain
Haqqani, Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States, urging certain actions against Pakistani
military. The manner in which the Inter-Services Intelligence chief submitted an incriminating
affidavit against the ambassador leading to his removal created suspicions of collusion between the
military and the Court against the government.
53
See Suo Motu Case No.5 of 2012, (2012) PLD (SC) 664. Similar allegations had formed the
basis of General Musharraf’s misconduct charges against the Chief Justice in 2007.
49
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scrutinize the allegations and insisting on heading the bench cast a
shadow over his impartiality and integrity.54 Four years after the
successful Lawyers’ Movement, fundamental divisions appeared to have
split the lawyers’ communities virtually down the middle, mostly along
party-political and rural-urban lines. While many of the district and periurban bar associations continued to support the judiciary's robust antigovernment stance, the more prominent High Court and Supreme Court
bar associations became increasingly critical of the exercise of judicial
power and accused the court of having over-stepped its constitutional
bounds. With the holding of elections in May 2013, a peaceful transfer of
power to the PML(N) at the federal level and a number of political parties
in the provinces, and the retirement of the Chief Justice in December
2013, Pakistan approached a period of relative calm at least as regards the
relations between the judiciary and the elected executive. 55
Despite the repeated claims that the Court had undermined an
elected government, bolstered the military’s covert role in politics, and
threatened Pakistan’s delicate democratic transition through its judicial
activism, it could be argued that the emergence of a powerful judiciary
had in fact strengthened democratic politics in Pakistan. 56 In addition to
invalidating the imposition of the emergency state by General Musharraf,
the Supreme Court also made symbolic pronouncements declaring
military intervention in politics illegal. 57 The Court also made tentative
advances in holding the executive’s claimed prerogatives in the domains
of national security and foreign policymaking, which arguably are
exercised more by the military and its intelligence agencies than the
elected government, to be justiciable. 58 In that context the limited ground
that the Supreme Court covered in checking the practice of enforced
abduction and extra-legal detention by the intelligence agencies was not
insignificant.59 The Court also made some progress in scrutinizing
54

See id.
See Moeen Cheema, Pakistan elections and the challenges facing the new government, AL
JAZEERA (May 13, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/05/201351355212336147.ht
ml.
56
See Sultan Babar Mirza, The Chaudhry Doctrine: A ‘Small-c Constitutional’ Perspective, in
POLITICS & JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, at 33.
57
See, e.g., Khan v Beg, (2013) PLD (SC) 1.
58
It can be argued that even the highly controversial Memo case, which was seen by many as an
attempt to destabilize the Presidency and the elected government, had the positive dimension of
establishing a precedent for holding both the civil and military establishments’ national security actions
justiciable. Notably, the serving Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence voluntarily submitted a
brief before the court in that case. See Moeen Cheema, Pakistan's clash of institutional authority, EAST
ASIA FORUM (Jan. 22, 2012), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/01/22/pakistan-s-clash-of-instit
utional-authority/.
59
See Cases Related to Missing Persons, SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN, http://www.supremeco
urt.gov.pk/HR_Cases/1st%20final/1st.htm.
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questionable financial transactions of corporate bodies affiliated with the
military. 60 Most significantly, through the extensive exercise of judicial
review of executive action, as discussed in the following section, the
Court took up and highlighted matters of maladministration and
corruption. The Court’s critics fretted that this kind of judicial activism
strengthened the military vis a vis a civilian government—after all
narratives of bad governance and corruption have historically provided
the military with the strongest arguments for intervening in or
overthrowing elected governments. However, it could be argued on the
contrary that the Court’s actions in fact deprived the military of its
strongest justification for overtly intervening in politics.
III.

THE “JUDICIALIZATION” OF GOVERNANCE: JUDICIAL REVIEW
EXECUTIVE ACTION BY THE CHAUDHRY COURT

OF

While the high profile constitutional controversies helped create a
perception (and reality) of confrontation between the superior judiciary
and the elected executive, the real site of institutional struggle, a kind of
protracted trench warfare, took place in the domain of administrative law.
In several cases the Supreme Court aggressively pursued charges of
corruption and crony capitalism against ministers and affiliates of the
federal government, senior members of the federal bureaucracy, and
appointees to public corporations and regulatory authorities.61 Many of
these cases were taken up suo motu upon reports of alleged corruption in
print and electronic media and had a dramatically negative impact on the
public perception of the executive's integrity and competence. 62 The
Court’s insistence upon impartial investigations into these allegations and
periodic public disclosures on progress before the Court made these cases
the subject of almost daily news reports and political talk shows. As the
incumbent government resisted the investigations initiated on the Court’s
insistence and subjected to its supervision, the Court’s proactive use of its
“Original Jurisdiction” to exercise the judicial review of executive action
became highly visible as well as politicized.

60
See, e.g., In re: Suo Motu Case No. 10 of 2009, (2010) SCMR (SC) 885 (complaint regarding
establishment of Makro-Habib Store on playground).
61
See, e.g., Bank of Punjab v. Haris Steel Ind. Ltd., (2010) PLD (SC) 1109; Yasin v. Fed’n of
Pakistan, (2012) PLD (SC) 132; In the matter of Alleged Corruption in Rental Power Plants etc.,
(2012) SCMR 773; Regional Director, Anti-Narcotics Force v. Khan, (2012) SCMR 870; Suo Motu
Case No. 11 of 2011, Supreme Court of Pakistan; Suo Motu Case No. 18 of 2010, Supreme Court of
Pakistan.
62
See, e.g., In the matter of Alleged Corruption in Rental Power Plants etc., (2012) SCMR 773.
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Mega-Corruption Scandals

The NRO saga was arguably the quintessential example of the
Supreme Court's administrative law jurisprudence. In addition to the
constitutional questions concerning the validity of the NRO as a
legislative measure, the organization and workings of NAB, the federal
agency tasked with the investigation and prosecution of corruption
offenses, came under intense scrutiny by the Court. NAB had played a
central role in the implementation of the NRO and the withdrawal of
cases domestically as well as internationally. As mentioned earlier,
during the hearing of the NRO case the NAB's chairmen and senior
prosecutors incurred the wrath of the court for their failure to exhibit
autonomous decision-making. Proceedings in separate cases resulted in
the dismissal of chairmen and lead prosecutors of the NAB on the
Supreme Court's orders. 63 The government attempted to retain control
over the NAB through subsequent appointments of beholden individuals
to these posts, leading to continuous friction between the Court and NAB.
The government’s control over NAB also ensured that individual
defendants secured acquittals through the special accountability courts set
up to try corruption cases as NAB prosecutors presented weak cases,
withdrew vital evidence, and made unwarranted concessions. As such,
the government achieved indirectly and piecemeal through NAB what it
could not get through the NRO. 64
Lacking any confidence in the independence and competency of
NAB, the Court sought alternatives. In several cases the Court
painstakingly undertook the task of supervising investigations into
corruption and other criminal cases by other federal agencies such as the
Federal Investigation Agency (FIA),65 regular police, and the AntiNarcotics Force (ANF). These agencies also became the turf of a
protracted battle between the Supreme Court and the federal government
over the appointment of independent officials and investigators, and the
conduct of impartial investigations.66 The Court was cognizant of the
ease with which influence over the provincial police and prosecution
services enabled the government to shield its affiliates from effective
63
See Bank of Punjab v. Haris Steel Ind. Ltd., 2010 PLD (SC) 1109; Orakzai v. Pakistan, 2011
PLD (SC) 365; Khan v. Fed’n of Pakistan, 2013 PLD (SC) 568.
64
See, e.g., Syed Irfan Raza, Record of another Zardari case missing, DAWN (Jan. 7, 2016, 7:30
AM), http://www.dawn.com/news/1231316; Raza Khan, Accountability court acquits Zardari in SGSCotecna case, DAWN (Nov. 24, 2015, 3:39 PM), http://www.dawn.com/news/1221946.
65
See, e.g., Suo Moto Case No. 18 of 2010, Supreme Court of Pakistan,
http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/Constitution_Petition_No.18.pdf.
66
See, e.g., Suo Motu Case No. 24 of 2010, Supreme Court of Pakistan (regarding corruption in
Hajj arrangements in 2010).
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prosecution. Recognizing the limitations of a supervisory technique, the
Court increasingly began appointing ad hoc fact-finding commissions
composed of trusted members of the lower judiciary and bureaucrats to
independently investigate cases. 67 However, as these commissions
lacked any judicial capacity and the Court itself lacked the authority to
make conclusive findings of fact in its judicial review jurisdiction, even
these cases had to be sent back to agencies such as the NAB, FIA, etc. for
investigation and/or prosecution.
A prime example of this kind of judicial review that involved
important members of the political executive is the so-called RPP case. 68
The Court took suo motu notice of allegations of corruption and
deliberate loss to the exchequer in the award of contracts to nineteen
rental power projects (RPPs). After hearing prima facie evidence of
wrongdoing, the Court directed the NAB to initiate criminal
investigations against the concerned federal minister, Raja Pervaiz
Ashraf, and senior officials in the ministry of water and power. While the
Court was successful in undoing the contracts with RPPs and ensured the
return of funds to the exchequer, NAB investigations against the federal
minister and other officials remained pending throughout the previous
government’s tenure and Raja Pervaiz Ashraf was even made the
replacement Prime Minister upon the disqualification of Prime Minister
Gilani by the Supreme Court. 69
Another such case involved suspected corruption in the allocation
of import licences for the drug ephedrine, a controlled substance that is
also used in the manufacture of narcotics, to suspect pharmaceutical
Important political personalities implicated in the
companies. 70
transaction included members of Parliament, Prime Minister Gilani’s son
Ali Musa Gilani, and the federal minster for health. Despite repeated
hearings and directions by the Supreme Court, the ANF failed to make
any significant headway in the case.

67
See, e.g., Imran Mukhtar, Profile of Tariq Khosa, THE NATION (Dec. 2, 2011),
http://nation.com.pk/national/02-Dec-2011/Profile-of-Tariq-Khosa.
68
In the matter of Alleged Corruption in Rental Power Plants etc., (2012) SCM (SC) 773.
69
See Mateen Haider, NAB to probe Parvez Ashraf for illegally awarding RPP contract, DAWN
(Apr. 14, 2015, 7:28 PM), http://www.dawn.com/news/1175888.
70
Regional Director, Anti-Narcotics Force v. Khan, (2012) SCMR 870; see also Huzaima
Bukhari & Ikramul Haq, Politics and Drugs, BUSINESS RECORDER (May 25, 2012),
http://www.brecorder.com/articles-a-letters/626:/1193159:politics-and-drugs/?date=2012-05-25.
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Bureaucratic Appointments and Crony Capitalism

Another notable example of a case in which the Court initiated
investigations into corruption scandals and revealed a nexus between key
appointments in regulatory agencies and public corporations is the OGRA
case. 71 This case concerned impropriety in the appointment of the
chairman of the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) in clear
disregard of the established process and required qualifications. The
Court dismissed the chairman and directed the NAB to initiate criminal
prosecution for alleged corruption in policymaking and the award of
concessions and licences by OGRA. In another case the Court
invalidated the extension of the President of National Bank of Pakistan’s
tenure on the grounds that it violated the statutory prohibition on
someone holding that office for more than two terms. 72 Likewise, the
Court voided the appointment of the Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission of Pakistan as it lacked transparency. 73
While the above cases focused on the appointments to key
positions in public corporations and regulatory bodies there were
underlying allegations of corruption and crony capitalism. In the NICL
case the Supreme Court took up such allegations against the management
of the National Insurance Corporation Ltd. (NICL), which had acquired
land from leading government and opposition politicians at exorbitant
prices causing the public corporation a loss of at least USD 500 million. 74
Another corruption scandal concerned the purchase of land at inflated
prices by the government’s Employees Old-age Benefits Institution
(EOBI). 75 The case concerned the purchase of properties in the military’s
Defence House Authority in Islamabad, which allegedly caused a loss of
nearly USD 400 million to EOBI.
The Court's struggles with ensuring independent investigation and
prosecution in corruption cases against executive officials embroiled it in
wider struggles over the nature and form of state structures, especially the
civil bureaucracy, regulatory agencies and public corporations. As the
Court attempted to break the shackles of political control over the state
apparatus and coax a culture of rule-bound and autonomous action, it
faced constant attrition and evasion. These battles took a similar form as
the accountability cases, with the Supreme Court insisting upon
71
72
73
74
75

Yasin v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (2012) PLD (SC) 132.
Idris v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (2011) PLD (SC) 213.
Tiwana v. Pakistan, (2013) SCMR 1159.
Suo Moto Case No. 18 of 2010, Supreme Court of Pakistan.
Constitution Petition No. 35 of 2013, Supreme Court of Pakistan.
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transparency and merit in appointments to key posts in the bureaucracy
amid claims of executive prerogative in postings, promotions, and
incentives. 76 The political executive historically developed several
techniques for ensuring the subservience of the administrative setup
including discretionary promotions to the senior-most ranks, discretionary
transfers to powerful and lucrative posts in disregard of seniority,
transfers to minor or sidelined positions as disincentive, and the retention
of retired bureaucrats to key posts on short-term contracts.
The Supreme Court persevered in insisting upon transparent
processes in promotions to the senior ranks and denied the government
the option of retaining retired bureaucrats unless clear exigencies were
manifested. It also subjected specific actions of senior bureaucrats to
severe scrutiny for non-compliance with established rules and procedures.
While it appeared that it was beyond the Court to undo the structures and
culture of patronage-based administration that have a post-colonial
history of more than six decades, the Court did manage to keep the
crumbling state structure at the center of judicial, and hence public,
attention.
C.

Judicial Regulation of the State

The scrutiny of appointments to executive posts in a vast array of
public corporations, semi-autonomous bodies, and regulatory agencies
exercising a tremendous portfolio of public powers outside the traditional
administrative set-up, expanded the terrain of contention between the
Supreme Court and the elected executive. These matters, mostly taken up
in suo motu proceedings, entangled the Court in the political economy of
policy-making, albeit in an indirect way. The Court confined itself to
scrutinizing transactions that reeked of corruption and crony capitalism.
In this way the Supreme Court identified faults in public agency
structures and processes that enabled policy-making in a non-transparent
fashion but without directly interfering in the workings of these public
agencies and corporations.77 As such, the implicit public law theory
identifiable in the Court's actions involving corruption charges and
appointments to state institutions appeared to center upon the need for an
independent and politically neutral state apparatus capable of functioning
within established rules and procedures, without being susceptible to
76
See, e.g., Human Rights Cases Nos. 8340, 9504-G, 13936-G, 13635-P & 14306-G TO 14309G of 2009, (2010) SCMR 1301; Constitution Petition No. 23 of 2012, Supreme Court of Pakistan.
77
See, e.g., Suo Motu Case No. 5 of 2010, (2010) PLD (SC) 731 (regarding huge loss to public
exchequer by ignoring the lowest bid of Fauji Foundation and Multinational Energy from Vitol by
awarding LNG contract).
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undue pressure from the elected executive. This strand of judicial review
culminated in the Khwaja Muhammad Asif case. 78 In a petition brought
by an opposition politician, currently a federal minister in the PML(N)
government, the Supreme Court directed the establishment of an
independent commission for overseeing and advising on key
appointments to regulatory bodies and public corporations. 79
One visible weakness in the Supreme Court's role as a regulator of
the state, however, was that the effects of the Court's administrative law
jurisprudence were limited to either discursive gains or minimal changes
at the top of the administrative hierarchy that took a long time to filter
down to the bottom of the pyramid, if at all. Beyond obstructing or
reversing questionable transactions and highlighting the nature and extent
of the elected government’s control over the high-level bureaucracy, the
Court achieved little. While these cases also developed a public
perception of endemic corruption amongst the political classes and the
apex bureaucracy, as well as of the impunity of the elected government
and state officials, the government was largely successful in thwarting the
Court’s campaign of de-politicizing the administration. Since the Court
was dependent upon the executive for the enforcement of its actions,
when its decisions were unpalatable for the executive, a prolonged tussle
involving all manner of dilatory and avoidance tactics was inevitable.
This involved the Court in the exasperating task of going up the
bureaucratic hierarchy step by step in subsequent enforcement and
contempt proceedings in an effort to identify the stumbling blocks and
override them with the threats of sanction. As these cases dragged on, the
Court also became visibly frustrated with its inability to counter this
perceived culture of governmental impunity and lawlessness. Arguably,
it is this frustration that ultimately manifested itself in the contempt
proceedings against two Prime Ministers and the conviction and
disqualification of an elected head of government in the NRO case.
Ultimately, however, the Court failed in its endeavour as most of the
corruption-related and other administrative law cases dragged on
seemingly endlessly.
While the Court focused on issues of governance, especially at the
highest levels, it did not engage directly in questions of socio-economic
policymaking or anything that may be classified as Social Action
Litigation (SAL) of the sort that the Indian Supreme Court engaged in the
heyday of its judicial populism. There were hardly any suo motu cases to
78
79

Asif v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (2013) SCMR 1205.
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speak of that directly attacked elite privilege or advanced the claims of
equitable development. There were no actions that placed demands on
the federal or provincial governments to reorient their policies toward
mass interests. This was not necessarily the Court’s doing. Occasional
actions on basic commodity pricing resulted in such concerted backlash
from liberal intelligentsia and urban lawyers that such interventions into
policy-making were quickly abandoned.80 And yet, there were plenty of
indirect actions—suo motu cases that undermined elite power, privilege
and patronage, and its nexus with the state—that were framed in formal
and procedural terms. 81 These included cases challenging the nonenforcement of rules governing urban planning and construction to the
benefit of well-connected or wealthy developers; 82 exercises of discretion
at the highest levels of bureaucracy that unduly favoured certain business
interests; 83 and allotment of government land to the those occupying
nodal positions in inter-connected networks of government, politics, and
wealth. 84 Noticeably these cases were tied to the pursuit of accountability
for political corruption and bureaucratic mal-governance, lending
credence to the claim that the administrative law jurisprudence of the
Court formed the core of its jurisprudence. This also provided a major
hint to the Court's unarticulated political-constitutional theory—
essentially a theory of liberal constitutionalism—that invested faith in the
reform of institutions of formal democracy and semi-independent but
rule-bound state structures as the pathway for long-term social and
economic change.
The issues of mass interest that the Court did take up related to the
abuse of authority by police and bureaucracy at the local level. The Court
initiated human rights cases based on information in the media or on the
applications of aggrieved persons sent to the Human Rights Cell of the
Supreme Court. Often these applications were little more than letters or
complaints written in lay terms containing basic factual information,
which the Court converted into petitions exercising its suo motu powers.
Between the years 2005 and 2013, the Chaudhry Court took up as many
80

See, e.g., Suo Motu Case No. 10 of 2007, (2008) PLD (SC) 673 (on sugar pricing); Jhagra v.
Fed’n of Pakistan, (2009) PLD (SC) 363 (on oil and natural gas pricing); Human Rights Commission
of Pakistan v. Government of Pakistan, (2009) PLD (SC) 507 (on bonded labor).
81
For examples of cases involving abuse of police powers, see Human Rights Case No. 66 of
2009, Supreme Court of Pakistan; Human Rights Case No. 3903 of 2007, Supreme Court of Pakistan.
82
See, e.g., Wafi Associates Ltd. v. Hamid, (2010) SCMR 1125. See also Suo Motu Case No. 3
of 2009, Supreme Court of Pakistan.
83
See, e.g., Human Rights Cases of Nos. 4668 of 2006, 1111 of 2007, & 15283-G of 2010,
(2010) PLD (SC) 759.
84
See, e.g., Suo Moto Case No. 14 of 2009, Supreme Court of Pakistan (allowing regularization
of 50 acres of land in Karachi at throw away prices); Human Rights Case No. 21950-S of 2009,
Supreme Court of Pakistan.
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as 113 such issues for hearing. 85 These cases related to matters such as
allegations of harassment by the police and revenue bureaucracy; 86
refusal of the police to register and investigate rape, murder and other
criminal cases; 87 torture in police custody and extra-judicial killings; 88
and the treatment of prisoners in jails. 89 Several of these human rights
cases concerned discriminatory customary practices, honor crimes against
women, and domestic violence. 90 Other cases related to discrimination in
pension, illegal dispossession of land, 91 or compensation for death or
personal injury caused by negligence of government departments and
agencies. 92
This was an extraordinary exercise of powers by the Supreme
Court as it took up individual grievances and human rights violations
directly under its Original Jurisdiction. Even more extraordinary was the
85

Qazi, supra note 4.
See, e.g., Human Rights Case No. 5466-P of 2010, Supreme Court of Pakistan.
87
See, e.g., Suo Moto Case No. 66 of 2009, Supreme Court of Pakistan; Human Rights Case
Nos. 44 of 2008 & 14 of 2009, Supreme Court of Pakistan, http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/HR_Case
s/10th%20final/44of2008,14of2009.pdf; Human Rights Case No. 4095 of 2006, Supreme Court of
Pakistan, http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/HR_Cases/2nd%20final/4095of2007.pdf; Human Rights
Case No. 4860 of 2006, Supreme Court of Pakistan, http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/HR_Cases/2nd%
20final/4860of2006.pdf; Human Rights Case No. 5443 of 2006, Supreme Court of Pakistan, http://ww
w.supremecourt.gov.pk/HR_Cases/2nd%20final/5443of2006.pdf; Suo Moto Case No. 12 of 2005
and Constitution Petition No. 22 of 2005, Supreme Court of Pakistan, http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk
/HR_Cases/11th%20final/SMC12of2005.pdf.
88
See, e.g., Human Rights Case No. 1109-P/2009, Supreme Court of Pakistan, http://www.supre
mecourt.gov.pk/HR_Cases/5th%20final/1109-Pof2009.pdf.
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See, e.g., Suo Moto Case No. 1 of 2006, Supreme Court of Pakistan,
http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/HR_Cases/11th%20final/SMC1of2006.pdf. See also M. Raheel
Kamran Sheikh, Taking Liberty Seriously, in POLITICS & JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, at 131.
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See, e.g., Human Rights Case No. 5466-P of 2010, Supreme Court of Pakistan,
http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/HR_Cases/10th%20final/5466-Pof2010.pdf; Human Rights Case No.
57 of 2009, Supreme Court of Pakistan, http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/HR_Cases/4rth%20final/
57of2009.pdf; Human Rights Case No. 4181-N of 2009, Supreme Court of Pakistan,
http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/HR_Cases/10th%20final/4181-Nof2009.pdf; Human Rights Case No.
12912-P of 2009, Supreme Court of Pakistan, http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/HR_Cases/6th%
20final/12912-Pof2009.pdf; Suo Moto Case No.1 of 2009, Supreme Court of Pakistan,
http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/HR_Cases/11th%20final/SMC1of2009.pdf; Criminal M.A. No. 396
of 2005, Supreme Court of Pakistan, http://www. supremecourt.gov.pk/HR_Cases/11th%20final/CP16
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91
See, e.g., Human Rights Case No. 29 of 2009, Supreme Court of Pakistan,
http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/HR_Cases/4rth%20final/29of2009.pdf; Human Rights Case No.
11108-P of 2009, Supreme Court of Pakistan, http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/HR_Cases/5th%20
final/11108-Pof20 09.pdf.
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See, e.g., Human Rights Case No. 2041-P of 2009, Supreme Court of Pakistan,
http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/HR_Cases/10th%20final/2041-Pof2009.pdf; Human Rights Case No.
2435 of 2006, Supreme Court of Pakistan, http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/HR_Cases/2nd%20final/
2435of2006.pdf; Human Rights Case No. 4805 of 2006, Supreme Court of Pakistan,
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functioning of the Human Rights Cell itself, which received more than
200,000 applications between 2009 and 2013.93 The Human Rights Cell
disposed of more than 180,000 such applications of its own accord
through administrative orders and directions under the threat of such
applications being converted into human rights cases if the Court’s
directions were not complied with. Despite such a large number of abuse
of power cases being taken up by the apex court, or by the Human Rights
Cell under its aegis, it is questionable whether the Court succeeded in
making any dent in the culture of abuse that pervaded civil
administration, in particular the police and revenue bureaucracy, and its
nexus with local politicians and those with power within rural social
hierarchies.
Nonetheless, the Court’s efforts at regulating the
administrative apparatuses unmasked the full extent of the postcolonial
state’s illegalities, including the mass of de jure and de facto
discretionary and unaccountable powers built into the state structures that
have historically rendered them amenable to the political purposes of both
military regimes and elected governments. Furthermore, the Court’s
human rights jurisdiction revealed the absence of any other redress
mechanism, whether internal to the administrative state or in the form of
administrative tribunals or an effective ombudsman system.
IV.

DECONSTRUCTING
COURT

THE

“JUDICIAL ACTIVISM”

OF THE

CHAUDHRY

Having laid out in detail the political context and analyzed the
important facets of its public law jurisprudence, it is possible to now
deconstruct and demystify the charge of judicial activism levelled against
the Chaudhry Court. In order to do that however, one must first define
judicial activism, which appears to be a notoriously difficult task. 94
Generally the term judicial activism is used both in a negative and a
positive sense, and often both at the same time by different people on the
opposite sides of a debate on the role of the judiciary. It is also notable
that the term is often employed in a binary configuration and in
opposition to an alternate conception of the judicial role. When used in a
93
Faisal Siddiqi, Public Interest Litigation: Predictable Continuity and Radical Departures, in
POLITICS & JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, at 77, 84.
94
Arguably, the term judicial activism connotes a number of related meanings, including the
invalidation of purportedly constitutional actions of other branches of government, disregard of
precedent, judicial lawmaking, disregard of established interpretative methodologies, and resultoriented judging. See Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism,” 92
CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1463–76 (2004). As many as seven different kinds of judicial activism have been
identified. See William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1217, 1219–20 (2002). See also, Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative
Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1144 (2002); Bradley C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions of
Judicial Activism, 66 JUDICATURE 236, 239 (1983).
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positive sense it is opposed with judicial quietism or passivity, a tendency
on the part of the courts to be excessively conservative, legalistic and
pedantic in the interpretation and application of the law. 95 When used in
a negative sense it is contrasted with appropriate judicial behaviour
defined as judicial restraint, avoidance of political questions, and
incremental development of the law. 96 Either use tells us how courts
ought not to act, but very little about how they ought to behave. The
dialectic set up by the negative and positive uses of the term judicial
activism along with their respective counterpoises calls for a golden mean
of judicial behaviour—neither too activist, nor too quietist—that may be
intuitively discerned by a sophisticated legal intellect but is virtually
impossible to define with any precision. The usage of the term judicial
activism thus marks the special preserve of the pundits of law.
When one begins to deconstruct the specific uses of the term, such
as in Pakistan’s context, it appears to carry several distinct but often
related meanings. First and foremost, in both the positive and negative
senses, the term refers to judicial lawmaking: expanding, broadly
interpreting or even disregarding the literal meanings of constitutional or
statutory text or established precedents. 97 Anyone remotely familiar with
the workings of a common law system knows that even the most
conservative courts do occasionally expand upon established
interpretations of text and depart from precedents, especially in the
domain of public law. 98 The real issue then is how much, 99 how often, 100
and in what circumstances are the courts entitled to push the boundaries
of precedent and legal text? However, determining whether a court is
suitably restrained or improperly activist is by its very nature based on the
assessment of a threshold or danger line on a slippery slope that a court is
not meant to cross. 101
Second, the term judicial activism can be used to refer to resultoriented judging. It connotes a court that goes beyond the “law” and
95
See generally P.N. Bhagwati, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation, 23 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 561 (1984).
96
The Hon. Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism,
73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1401, 1401 (2002).
97
See Bhagwati, supra note 95, at 563, 565. One must distinguish between the treatments of
different types of precedents. Apex courts often make noticeable distinctions between constitutional,
statutory, common laws, and precedents and accord them different treatment. See Kmiec, supra note
94, at 1469–70.
98
Judges who are political conservatives are often as open to the charge of judicial activism as
political liberals and progressives. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 94.
99
See Young, supra note 94, at 1151–52.
100
See Canon, supra note 94, at 241–42.
101
See Young, supra note 94, at 1163–64.
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relies instead on its understanding of political or policy considerations to
deliver an expansive interpretation that unsettles established law. 102
Unless a court is prepared to slavishly confine itself to established
precedents and a strictly literalist mode of interpreting a constitution’s
inherently vague and open-ended language, it will be susceptible to a
charge of judicial activism on this plane. When courts expand or depart
from precedents, they cannot be said to be basing their decisions on law,
strictly speaking. What do such courts base their decisions on:
understandings of constitutional politics? Good governance? Underlying
policy? Understandings of social good? Again, all lawyers know that
common law courts do take into account such non-legal considerations at
least to some extent. The use of the term judicial activism is meant to
convey that some result-oriented decision-making is acceptable but
beyond an abstract line in the sand it becomes problematic. 103
Increasingly, judicial activism has also been understood as judicial
over-reach or even adventurism, and as adjudicating upon matters that lie
more appropriately in the political domain, i.e., the “judicialization of
politics.” In this permutation, the term conveys the meaning that the
courts are overstepping constitutional bounds and intruding on the terrain
of other state institutions. 104 If courts start laying down too much law too
quickly they start acting like political institutions and hence, as per
democratic theory, usurp the power that legitimately belongs to the
elected institutions of the state. The use of the term judicial activism in
this meaning is thus also inherently designed to convey the idea that
courts ought to be reasonably conservative. If fundamental questions of
justice, the nature of the state, basic liberties and entitlements arise, these
questions ought to be left to the other institutions to determine. 105 If
courts do not abide by this dictate they will become politicized.
This notion of judicial behaviour articulated imprecisely,
sometimes in a positive but more often in a negative sense with an
overtone of emotive-rationality, rests on certain foundational
assumptions. Leaving aside the question of whether these assumptions
are true in more stable political and legal systems, it can be argued that
102
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case against Judicial Activism:
A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1091, 1094 (2005); Lino A. Graglia, It’s
Not Constitutionalism, It’s Judicial Activism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 293, 298 (1996); Young,
supra note 93, at 1149–50. See also Canon, supra note 94, at 245.
103
When used in a negative sense, the term judicial activism often means that the critic disagrees
with the decision(s) and not much else. See Marshall, supra note 94, at 1217.
104
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 16–18 (1962).
105
See, e.g., Graglia, supra note 102, at 296.
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they are misplaced in most jurisdictions of the Global South. The key
assumption—borrowed often from legal systems whose colonial burden
is still carried with a great deal of gratitude—is that the law is by and
large functional and fair, and hence strict enforcement and legal stability
are positive in and of themselves. This idea of the judicial role also rests
on the assumption that other democratic institutions are doing their job, or
more appropriately in our context will do their job if the other centers of
state power—the military, and now more recently the superior courts—
stop interfering and let them get on with it. The socio-economic fruits of
democracy and rule of law will trickle down in due time, of course.
Apolitical, moderately activist and yet reasonably restrained courts are
thus of value as they ensure a stable system of governance, democratic
continuity, and basic elements of the rule of law.
In a place like Pakistan, with deeply entrenched inequalities in the
social, economic, political, and legal domains, there is no terrain of
neutrality—no possibility of an apolitical court that simply does the law
and very little politics or policy.106 The courts have three choices. First,
the courts can either play their part in bolstering the status quo passively
through quietism or actively through politically conservative decisionmaking. Second, they can challenge the governance system in small
ways through moderate activism that does not pose a serious threat but at
the same time indirectly legitimize the system by creating a sense of some
possibility of relief and incremental reform. Alternatively, the judiciary
can destabilize the political dispensation in significant ways. It is simply
easier to determine the overt politics of so-called activist courts. It is
much harder to discern the subterranean politics of quietist or less activist
courts that reinforce the status quo.
As such, there is an altogether different dimension at which the
usage of the term judicial activism ought to understood and evaluated.
Courts are considered activist when their politics are out of step with the
kind of politics espoused by elected institutions and, even more
importantly, the political settlement amongst the dominant elites and socalled civil society. It is then that the negative sense of the term judicial
activism is employed most viciously to bring the courts back into line.
Another kind of context in which the use of the term becomes salient, and
which is much closer to the situation in Pakistan, is when the political
establishment is in flux or there is conflict amongst the elites or between
the entrenched elites and the middle classes. In such a scenario the courts
are put in a difficult position when called upon to act as the arbiters or
106
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mediators of such conflict. There is no pleasing all sides. Invariably the
courts are politicized.
Therefore, in a socio-political context such as Pakistan’s the
question we ought to be asking is not whether the courts are doing law or
engaging in politics. Rather, we should be asking what kind of politics
the court in question is engaging in. What are the consequences of its
politics? Who benefits? Who is disadvantaged? However, before we
can meaningfully ask these questions, we need to be open and candid
about our own politics. Employing such euphemistic terms as judicial
activism or judicial overreach—or rule of law, separation of powers, or
even democracy as they are often employed in the public discourse in
Pakistan—is designed to hide the user’s own politics while critiquing (or
legitimizing) the politics of institutional players. This article thus
jettisons the use of such loaded and mystifying terminology. It puts the
politics of the court front and center. One may or may not agree with the
substantive positions advanced herein, but one should heed the call of this
article to take the politics of courts seriously.
A.

The Constitutional Politics of the Judicial Activism Critique

Analyzing the Chaudhry Court’s constitutional law jurisprudence
in terms of the above discussion on judicial activism, it is evident that
while the Court pushed the doctrinal boundaries on several issues, it is
difficult to claim that the Court completely disregarded precedent and
established law. There were sound legal reasons for the Court’s decisions
as much as there were for the alternatives that the critics advocated. As
such, the criticism centered on the choices made by the Court within legal
alternatives available to it. Therefore, the critique of judicial activism
was as inherently political as the actions of the Court. For example,
Prime Minister Gilani’s conviction by the Supreme Court rested on
cogent arguments that the refusal to follow the Court’s directions in the
NRO case amounted to contempt of court. 107 The decision not to argue
the defence of presidential immunity before the Court left his legal team
with a much more limited defense, arguing the Prime Minister’s qualified
immunity on the basis that he had acted in good faith, believing the
President to be immune from prosecution. This was bound to be a
difficult argument as it implied that the Prime Minister had an
independent capacity to interpret the constitution even if such an
interpretation contradicted an express order of the apex court. In a
107
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similar vein, the subsequent disqualification of the Prime Minister by a
three-member bench of the Court was questioned mostly on the grounds
of the political impropriety of such an action, rather than its legal basis.108
Critics argued that the Supreme Court ought to have left the question of
disqualification to the Speaker of the National Assembly, a difficult
argument as the established case law held that determinations of the
Speaker were justiciable in such circumstances. 109 Ironically, the critics
of the Court argued for judicial restraint on political rather than legal
grounds while at the same time arguing that it was the Court that was
acting politically.
Furthermore, the critique of judicial activism in this domain was
based more on what the Court was perceived as threatening to do than
what it actually did. In the NRO case, for example, the Court’s
judgement did not question the validity of the legislation itself. 110 The
fears underlying the critique of the Court’s decision, particularly its
efforts at enforcing the order regarding the reinstatement of the Swiss
case against President Zardari, included the Court threatening to strip him
of presidential immunity, thereby preparing the ground for his subsequent
disqualification. 111 That threat never materialized and resulted in the
government pursuing the flawed legal strategy of never arguing
presidential immunity before the Court in either the NRO case or the
contempt proceedings against Prime Minister Gilani. Similarly, the main
controversy in the 18th Amendment case was based on the Court’s
perceived inclination or implied threat to repeal a constitutional
amendment on the touchstone of the “basic structure” doctrine as the
Indian Supreme Court had done at the height of its activism. 112 Again,
the Court did not take such an unprecedented step and the matter was
resolved through the 19th Amendment, which accommodated most of the
Court’s recommendations. The subsequent decision to hold the findings
of the parliamentary committee justiciable and other cases concerning
108
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judicial appointments did indeed push doctrinal boundaries.113 However,
such aggressive activism by a court locked in a conflict with the
executive and looking to safeguard its hard-won independence is
understandable, if not fully justifiable, and certainly not unheard of.
After all, both the Pakistani and Indian Supreme Courts exhibited such
self-interested jurisprudence in the 1990s.114
B.

Back to the Future of Administrative Law: Reincarnation of the
Public Interest Litigation of the 1990’s

Just like in the constitutional cases discussed above, the Chaudhry
Court’s administrative law actions exhibited a limited form of judicial
activism. The Court's administrative law jurisprudence was built upon
the robust foundations of empowering constitutional text. Landmark
precedents of the superior courts had laid the doctrinal groundwork for
intrusive judicial review of executive action in the late 1980s and
throughout the 1990s. However, the key difference between the
administrative law activism of the superior courts in the 1990s and that
under the Chaudhry Court was the locus of action. The administrative
law activism of the superior courts in the 1990s was centered on the
exercise of the writ jurisdiction by the High Courts under Article 199 of
the Constitution. Article 199 empowers the High Courts to undertake
judicial review and grant the writs of certiorari, mandamus, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto (without employing those Latin terms). 115
113

See Moeen Cheema & Shahzad Akbar, Pakistan: New “Judges’ Case” in the Making?,
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114
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& Transfer of Judges, AIR 1999 SC 1 (India). It is notable that the position of the superior judiciary’s
role in its own appointment has effectively converged in India and Pakistan in the aftermath of the
recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
115
See PAKISTAN CONST. arts 199(1)(a), (b): “(1) Subject to the Constitution, a High Court may,
if it is satisfied that no other adequate remedy is provided by law,—
(a) on the application of any aggrieved party, make an order – (i) directing a person performing,
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Article 199 also provides for the High Court’s human rights jurisdiction
in rather broad terms: the court can make any “order giving such
directions to any person or authority, including any Government [. . .] as
may be appropriate for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights
. . . .” 116 In the 1990s, the High Courts considerably expanded their writ
and human rights jurisdictions with the support of the Supreme Court.
Many of these cases had visible political undertones.
For example, it was held that the executive’s interference in
appointments of the subordinate judiciary or granting of judicial powers
to the bureaucracy violated the trichotomy of powers principle. 117 The
superior courts also sought to curtail the powers of the executive to
legislate through ordinance. 118 In matters related to criminal process, the
High Courts were held to have considerable power in terms of directing
the registration or quashing of criminal cases, but not to the extent of
continuing control or supervision of the trial. 119 The High Courts also
scrutinized preventative detention and went to the extent of awarding
compensation for illegal detentions by the police. 120 While the High
Courts considerably expanded their judicial review of executive action
jurisdiction in the 1990s, with the backing of the Supreme Court, the text
of Article 199 imposed some constraints nonetheless. Writs could be
brought only upon application of an “aggrieved person” and, except in
cases of habeas corpus and quo warranto writs, only in circumstances
the Federation, a Province or a local authority has been done or taken without lawful authority and is of
no legal effect; or
(b) on the application of any person, make an order – (i) directing that a person in custody within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Court be brought before it so that the Court may satisfy itself that he is
not being held in custody without lawful authority or in an unlawful manner; or (ii) requiring a person
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court holding or purporting to hold a public office to show
under what authority of law he claims to hold that office[.]
116
See PAKISTAN CONST. art. 199(1)(c) (“Subject to the Constitution, a High Court may, if it is
satisfied that no other adequate remedy is provided by law . . . on the application of any aggrieved
person, make an order giving such directions to any person or authority, including any Government
exercising any power or performing any function in, or in relation to, any territory within the
jurisdiction of that Court as may be appropriate for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights
conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II.”).
117
See Gov’t of Sindh v. Faridi, (1994) PLD (SC) 105. The Supreme Court upheld the Sindh
High Court’s directions to the provincial government to separate judicial magistracy from executive
magistracy and place judicial magistrates under the authority of the High Court. Faridi v. The Fed’n of
Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1989) PLD (Karachi) 404 (aff’d, (1989) PLD (SC) 105). In Gov’t of
Balochistan v. Memon, (1993) PLD (SC) 341, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision that
a 1968 ordinance was unconstitutional to the extent it gave powers to the bureaucracy to take
cognizance of and try certain offenses.
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(1999) PLD (Lahore) 320; Government of Punjab v. Ziaullah, (1992) SCMR (SC) 602.
119
See Dogar v. Qasim, (1994) PLD (SC) 281.
120
See, e.g., Parveen v. District Magistrate, (1988) PLD (Lahore) 611; Mazharuddin v. State,
(1998) PCrLJ (Karachi) 1035.

478

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 25 NO. 3

where there was no suitable alternate remedy. 121 The High Courts
loosened both the requirements of a lack of alternate remedy and locus
standi, particularly in cases falling under their fundamental rights
jurisdiction, but the text of Article 199 remained a significant obstacle. 122
As such, by the end of the 1990s the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts
had become the preserve of urban elites who could afford to employ the
better lawyers and increasingly found in the writ a more efficacious
avenue for challenging governmental action that affected their
interests. 123
The Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article
184(3) of the Constitution emerged as the avenue for a truer form of
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the 1990s. Article 184(3) enables the
Supreme Court to take up any matter of “public importance with
reference to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights” and grant
any remedy in the nature of those provided for in Article 199.124 While
the language of the Article 184(3) had been enabling from the beginning,
it took the Court nearly two decades to construct the jurisprudential basis
for such a transformation. During the 1990s, the Supreme Court first
whittled down the requirement of standing to the point that any bona fide
representative could bring a petition on behalf of an effected group or
class, then took it further to the point that the Court itself could initiate
cases suo motu. 125 The Court also adopted the methodology of “rolling
review” from the Indian Supreme Court, issuing interim orders in
successive hearings rather than one final decisive judgment, and
supervising executive action on a periodic basis. 126 Furthermore, the
Court also acted as or appointed judicial commissions investigating
various facets of governance. The ambit of fundamental rights was also
broadened to include socio-economic rights within the umbrella of the
right to life. 127 It must be noted, however, that such broadening of rights
was designed mostly to bring cases within the Court's judicial review
121
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eds., 2000).
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jurisdiction and not necessarily to enable the Court to grant substantive
remedies and binding directions for their enforcement.
The one thing constraining the Court's Original Jurisdiction in the
1990s was the definition of “public importance,” which required that
questions of public importance must affect people at large and not just
identifiable groups or classes. 128 The Court thus took up a narrow set of
issues related mostly to the elaboration of fundamental rights and
increasingly issued directions to governments to amend existing laws and
regulations. With this quasi-legislative power the Court resembled a
potent law reform commission with the power to recommend, or at times
compel, lawmaking. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court took up a relatively
small number of cases under its Original Jurisdiction, and by and large
confined itself to issuing guidelines or directions to the executive, which
were generally ignored. This left the impression of a court making bold
rhetorical pronouncements on fundamental rights, but having no impact
on the ground. By the end of the 1990s, the Supreme Court’s PIL had
also lost its luster, partly due to its inefficacy and partly due to the
politicization of the Supreme Court due to internal divisions. 129 The
Supreme Court used the pretext of an increased backlog of cases and
progressively curtailed its PIL jurisdiction. This was the jurisprudential
legacy that the Chaudhry Court inherited, interrupted by the exigencies of
military rule in the first half-decade of General Musharraf's tenure.
C.

The Proactivism of the Chaudhry Court

As such, the Chaudhry Court's public law jurisprudence can hardly
be labelled as judicial activism because the term refers more
appropriately to courts stretching established jurisprudential principles
and developing novel interpretations of law. If anything, the Supreme
Court exhibited “judicial proactivism” because it applied pre-existing
principles, exercised established powers, and granted traditional remedies
in an unprecedented number of cases, many of which were taken up on its
own initiative and with an alacrity that kept the structural failings of the
administrative set-up continuously in the spotlight. The Supreme Court
128
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thus transformed its Original Jurisdiction from an exceptional avenue for
the enforcement of fundamental rights to an easily accessible forum for
the deliberation of constitutional and legal questions affecting “public
interest.” This transformation of the Original Jurisdiction under Article
184(3) began when the Court started to define questions of “public
importance” more broadly.130 In the Chaudhry Court's interpretation of
the constitutional republic, any matter related to the interpretation and
enforcement of the Constitution affected the public at large and was
necessarily a matter of significance. 131 As such, any politically minded
citizen had the right to challenge the interpretation and enforcement of
the Constitution.
This principle was soon extended to the interpretation and
enforcement of laws of general applicability so that any citizen could
challenge the legality of any law subject to the court's inherent discretion.
Accordingly, the Court began to hear cases involving individual
grievances against the abuse of laws, police powers and bureaucratic
discretion. 132 When Justice Chaudhry established the Human Rights Cell
in the Supreme Court, it institutionalized the Court's proactivism in
initiating suo motu and human rights cases. It was thus the Chaudhry
Court that transformed Pakistan's constitutional and administrative law
into a truly public law and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
into a tool of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in an accurate sense of that
phrase. It is debatable whether the Chaudhry Court’s proactivism has
been any more effective than the PIL activism of the Supreme Court in
the 1990s in terms of undermining the culture of abuse of power that
permeates the executive. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, the Court’s
efforts at regulating the administrative apparatuses have shown the
pathology of the postcolonial state and unmasked the full extent of its
illegalities, the mass of de jure and de facto discretionary and
unaccountable powers built into the state structures, which have
historically rendered them amenable to elite dominance. Most
significantly, the Chaudhry Court’s administrative law proactivism has
highlighted the absence of any other form of redress, whether judicial or
administrative, against the illegalities of the post-colonial state and its
allied elites.
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Explaining and Evaluating the “Judicialization of Politics” in
Pakistan

The public law proactivism of the Supreme Court under former
Chief Justice Chaudhry brought the supposed distinction between law and
politics to the forefront of public discourse in Pakistan. While the
Chaudhry Court was increasingly criticized for engaging in judicial
activism, that critique holds little analytical value as it rests on the
conservative and unrealistic notions of an apolitical judiciary and hard
distinctions between law and politics. These notions are unrealistic
because the Supreme Court’s role, like that of any apex court with
constitutional and administrative law jurisdiction, has always been deeply
and structurally political. These notions are conservative because they
seek to provide a veneer of apolitical legitimacy to inaction and pro status
quo politics of courts. The increasing judicialization of politics is the
norm around the world, 133 and most recently courts in Asia have become
noticeably activist. 134 However, the judicialization of politics is as much
a new reality as it is changing perception. As Martin Shapiro poignantly
notes, the term implies that:
[C]ourts did not do much politics yesterday, but do a lot
today. And surely there was some real global spread of and
increased significance of judicial interventions in public
policymaking in the latter half of the twentieth century and
beyond . . . . [But] to a very large degree it is not so much
that courts do more now as that students of politics now see
more of what courts do. 135
Therefore, a much more significant and rewarding mode of inquiry
focuses not on whether courts are activist or restrained but rather on the
underlying causes of judicial activism and restraint and the evaluation of
the political consequences of the court’s actions and inactions. To
borrow from Upendra Baxi:
[A] fruitful analysis of the activity of the Court can begin
only when we broadly agree that judicial process at the
133
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Supreme Court (and appellate) levels is a species of political
process and that constitutional adjudication is essentially a
political activity expressed through the medium of legal and
jurisprudential language and action. It is only when we
accept that the Court is doing politics, in this sense, that the
question can arise as to what kind of politics it ought to do in
a free society: the politics of justice or politics of power?
the politics of order or of change? the politics of status quo
or that of innovation? the politics of survival or that of
aspiration? the politics of establishment or that of
opposition? the politics of today (the immediate present) or
of tomorrow and the day after (the immediate future)? the
politics for the people or politics against the people? the
politics of hope or the one of despair? 136
Ran Hirschl has advanced a highly influential account of the global
phenomena of judicialization of politics. 137 Just as Baxi critiques the
calls for judicial restraint on the touchstone of apolitical and neutral
constitutionalism, Hirschl challenges the valorization of rights-based
constitutionalism as inevitable and inherently valuable. 138 Hirschl sees
judicial review centered on adjudication of constitutional rights not only
in terms of unelected courts dominating political decision-making but as
part of a broader movement whereby political and policymaking power is
shifted to semi-autonomous and professional institutions and as a result to
those classes and groups that have access to and influence upon such
institutions. 139 As such, the “constitutionalization of rights is . . . often
not a reflection of genuinely progressive revolution in a polity; rather, it
is evidence that the rhetoric of rights and judicial review has been
appropriated by threatened elites to bolster their own position in the
polity.” 140
Hirschl considers judicialization of politics to be a product of
strategic interplay and alignment of the interests of otherwise competing
elites: political elites seeking to shield policymaking from democratic
political processes in which they are likely losers, economic elites that see
constitutionalization of rights as a means to achieve security and stability
of contract and private property rights, and judicial elites that are mindful,
136
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at least to some extent, of their own institutional interests. 141 These projudicialization elites are bolstered by urban intelligentsia, the legal
profession, and the managerial classes, all of whom also stand to benefit
from the judicialization of politics. 142 The voluntary ceding of power to
judiciaries by political elites that are ascendant in the democratic
processes can also be explained as attempts by such elites to avoid
responsibility for politically costly decisions. 143 The motivation for such
voluntary ceding is particularly strong when elected governments foresee
losing power in the future and judicialization becomes a means to
entrench policies and limit the future options of political opponents and
successor governments. 144 Judiciaries are themselves an important
strategic player in that they see judicialization as a means to improve the
power of the judicial institutions in the state structure as well as a means
to enhance the reputation and prestige of judges compared to other
institutions. 145
This “hegemonic preservation thesis” thus sees
judicialization of politics as “part of a broader process whereby selfinterested political and economic elites, while they profess support for
democracy and sustained development, attempt to insulate policymaking
from the vagaries of democratic politics,” 146 and not as a “significant step
towards egalitarianism.” 147
The Pakistani situation seems to fit Hirschl’s framework, which
helps explain several facets of the politics and jurisprudence of the
Chaudhry Court. The constitutional actions of the Chaudhry Court, and
the resultant judicialization of politics, appear at least partly to be
informed by a strategy to enhance its public prestige and to advance the
position of the judiciary relative to the elected executive and
legislature. 148 At the same time, much of the administrative law
proactivism of the Court was designed to secure some independence for
the apex bureaucracy, policing institutions, regulatory bodies and
economic policymaking from the elected executive dominated by the
PPP. The PPP government voluntarily ceded considerable power to the
judiciary consistent with Hirschl’s thesis except when it perceived its
very existence and vital interests to be at stake. The opposition political
parties, especially the PML(N), was often the petitioner in important
public law cases, using such litigation as a means to elicit concessions
141
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from and embarrass the PPP government. 149 Most significantly, much of
the jurisprudence of the Chaudhry Court aligned with the interests of the
departing hegemons: the military establishment and its allied classes.
The narrative of political corruption and the instability caused by the
Court’s persistent scrutiny compelled the elected PPP government to
quickly cede national security and foreign policy-making power almost
exclusively to the military.
However, there are also several noticeable aspects of the Chaudhry
Court’s constitutional politics and jurisprudence that do not fully accord
with Hirschl’s judicialization thesis. As noted in the preceding sections,
while the Court indirectly assisted the military in regaining ascendancy in
the national security and foreign policy domains, it also challenged the
security establishment’s impunity in cases of enforced disappearance and
held certain of its actions justiciable. The Court’s sporadic interventions
in economic policy-making were more a challenge to elite economic
interests rather than a means to assure security to contractual, private
property and foreign investment related interests of the dominant
economic classes. 150 Most significantly, the Court’s attempts at garnering
a broader political constituency that it could leverage in its jostling for
position with the elected institutions and the military incentivized it to
take up non-elite causes. The Court’s human rights jurisdiction, the suo
motu cases challenging abuse of police and bureaucratic powers, and the
work of the Human Rights Cell were instrumental in gaining for it the
necessary support from segments of Pakistan’s broader population—and
not just the support of opposition political parties and lawyers’ collectives
—which served as vital political capital in its protracted conflict with the
elected executive.
The case study of the Chaudhry Court thus confirms as much as it
complicates the judicialization of politics thesis. While much of the
constitutional politics and jurisprudence of the Chaudhry Court aligns
with strategic play of elite interests, including those of the judicial elite,
there is at least one aspect—the proto-democratic dimension of the
Court’s public law proactivism—that cannot be fully explained within
Hirschl’s framework. While this does not raise a fundamental challenge
to the explanation and evaluation of judicialization of politics on
Hirschl’s terms, it does certainly place a rider on the impulse to
149
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150
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characterize judicialization of politics everywhere and at all times to be of
questionable value. In fact, the case study of the Chaudhry Court calls
upon this judicialization framework to take its own fundamental premise
seriously—that of the political contingency of judicialization. The
politics of judicialization, like all forms of politics, is temporally unstable
and rests on shifting alignments of class and group interests. 151 As such,
while judicialization of politics may structurally and consistently advance
elite interests and undermine democratic politics, it may occasionally and
not insignificantly offer avenues of resistance and become a mode for reenergizing democratic politics. The Chaudhry Court of Pakistan offered
us a fleeting glimpse of egalitarian political possibilities of
judicialization.
V.

A POSTSCRIPT IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION

With the end of the Chaudhry Court era in December 2013, the
Supreme Court faced an unenviable choice: to persist with a campaign to
curb the illegalities of the executive or to make a strategic retreat and
thereby effectively let itself be co-opted in the governance arrangement.
It chose the latter option. The charge of judicial activism had resonated to
such an extent that the Supreme Court, post-Chaudhry era, adopted a
position of judicial restraint on a range of political questions that were
raised before it. The suo motu and human rights jurisdictions dwindled
and the Supreme Court progressively resettled into a more traditional
judicial role. However, what has been learned, that is the extent of the
illegalities of the postcolonial state and its nexus with political power and
social hierarchy, cannot be unlearned; it can only be ignored. The range
of grievances that were highlighted by the Chaudhry Court’s public law
proactivism have not been resolved but only marginalized once again.
The post-Chaudhry Supreme Court went further than merely
slipping back into a quieter mode. As various chief justices served
relatively short tenures dictated by the constitutionally fixed retirement
age and the vagaries of birth dates, at times the Court went to the extent
of visibly reversing decisions of the Chaudhry era through a liberal use of
its review jurisdiction. A remarkable example of this phenomenon is the
Khwaja Muhammad Asif case. 152 In response to a petition brought by a
prominent member of the opposition PML(N), the Chaudhry Court had
directed the establishment of an independent commission for overseeing
and advising on key appointments to regulatory bodies and public
151
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corporations. In a complete reversal of its position after coming into
power, the PML(N) government filed a petition for the review of the
judgment arguing that the decision undermined the Prime Minister’s
constitutional prerogative. The Supreme Court overturned its earlier
ruling upon such a review. 153 Which of the two decisions—the original
one or the reversal on review—was legal and which political? Such
decisions further highlight the artificiality of the law-politics distinction
that the use of the term judicial activism is premised on.
Even in regards to the Supreme Court’s restraint on political
controversies, it has largely served to undermine rather than bolster
democratic politics. Ironically, the decision of the Chaudhry Court that
has left the most significant political legacy for post-Chaudhry political
landscape of Pakistan was a rare instance of non-intervention. Having
overseen the transition from one elected government to another for the
first time in Pakistan’s political history, the Chaudhry Court faced
immediate demands from the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI), led by
cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan, which emerged as the second
largest party in terms of total votes polled, to probe allegations of
systemic rigging. Relying on Article 225 of the Constitution which vests
exclusive jurisdiction to determine election disputes in specially
constituted election tribunals, the Chaudhry-led bench declined to set up a
commission to investigate the charges of large-scale electoral fraud. 154
While strictly in accordance with the text of the Constitution and the
established practice of the Court of not interfering in individual singleconstituency disputes in electoral matters, the decision appeared to be a
clear departure from its more recent interventionist stance. 155 Given that
153
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members of the lower judiciary had acted as the Returning Officers in the
May 2013 elections, the judiciary’s institutional role in the conduct of
elections became controversial.156
In August 2014, more than a year after the conduct of elections and
while the overwhelming majority of election petitions remain unresolved,
the PTI launched a protest movement beginning with yet another “Long
March” on the capital Islamabad. By December 2014, a protest sit-in
continued in front of the Parliament house in Islamabad, and the PTI
organized public meetings and called for strikes and protest marches in
various urban centers all over the country. The ghosts of eras past—
speculations of tacit support of the protesters by the military or even
threat of direct military intervention—re-emerged to haunt Pakistan’s
political landscape. 157 All this while the Supreme Court, the only
institution seemingly capable of resolving this toxic political deadlock in
a constitutional manner, sat quietly on the sidelines implicitly adhering to
a resurrected “political question” doctrine. This legacy of the Chaudhry
Court’s non-intervention—the refusal to investigate allegations of
electoral rigging—provides the starkest example of political instability
caused by judicial restraint. The course of judicial restraint or judicial
quietism is thus as political as the decision to pursue judicial activism.
The proof of judicial politics, like all forms of politics, is in its
consequences.
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